This article uses the case of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and its liquidation during the First World War to examine the challenges faced by German businesses during the war in China and China's involvement in Allied economic warfare. This case suggests the detrimental effect that political crises and global shifts of power had on foreign businesses in modern China's globalized treaty port economy. It also reveals China's role in the global economic warfare of the Allies, showing that China first resisted Allied demands for a full liquidation of the German bank but eventually acquiesced to Allied pressure and handed control over the liquidation to the Allies. As a consequence, China ended up violating the very international law it had put so much value on when entering the war.
February 1917, the Ministry of Finance was still unsure about how to deal with enemy banks in the case of war and asked the Chinese minister in Japan, Zhang Zongxiang, how Japan had treated German and Austrian banks. Zhang replied only that Japan had ordered enemy banks to stop their operations and had restricted the right of enemy subjects to withdraw money from these banks. 5 On the day of China's entry into the war, China issued the "Regulations of Treatment for the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank." 6 These regulations stipulated that the DAB stop its business and that all assets of the German government held by the bank be confiscated. All other assets were to be handed over to representatives of the Chinese government for safekeeping. For the moment, enemy subjects were not allowed to withdraw any money and even non-enemy subjects were allowed to access their savings only after approval from the Chinese government. The representatives sent by the Chinese government were ordered to collect the account books of the bank and to create an inventory of the bank's assets. The whole operation was to be carried out jointly by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Bank of China. These regulations were meant to be provisional, but they indicate that at this point the Chinese government merely intended to stop the bank's business and confiscate government assets. While it has been claimed that China "immediately liquidated the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank" after the declaration of war to use the bank's assets as a remedy for its own financial situation (Xu 2005, 173-174) , these regulations show that China initially wanted only to sequester the bank's assets and had no intention to confiscate all the bank's assets for its own use.
When considering this rather mild initial treatment of the bank by the Chinese government, it is worth remembering that in 1917 China witnessed a heated debate about Moazzin 56 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 16 (September 2015) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-16) whether or not it should participate in the war, which created a serious constitutional crisis and left the nation divided. During this debate important groups within Chinese society, from business associations to political elites, opposed the severing of relations with and declaration of war against Germany. While Chinese businesspeople mainly feared the disruptive effect the declaration of war would have on their businesses, political elites argued that China was too weak to gain equality with other nations or to uphold international law if it joined the Allies (Xu 2005, 204-222) . It is no surprise, then, that even after the declaration of war, members of the German business community in China reported that many Chinese elites seemed to still hold friendly feelings toward Germany and even tried to save German property (Ratenhof 1987, 268) . Even the Shanghai manager of the DAB, Heinz Figge, was able to maintain "cordial relations with Chinese officials," who were "anxious not to do anything that might offend German susceptibilities after the war." 7 While the sequestration of the bank was nominally carried out by the Chinese government alone, the Allies-and most importantly Britain-were involved right from the beginning as well. On the day before the declaration of war, the Chinese Foreign Office had already contacted the British minister to China, John Jordan, to arrange for cooperation in dealing with the DAB. Moreover, the Bank of China, which was to carry out the sequestration of the bank on the ground, always sent one of its foreign employees to handle the sequestration of the DAB branches, along with the director of the respective local branch of the Bank of China. 8 While these foreign bankers were employees of the Bank of China, they were also in contact with their legations and kept the Allies updated on their progress in the sequestration of the DAB. 9 As G. Passeri, an Italian employee of the Bank of China and one of the foreign sequestrators, put it, these foreign bankers acted as "guardian[s] of Allied interests." 10 During the next few months, the managers of the Bank of China together with the foreign sequestrators seized the premises of the different DAB branches and tried to create lists of the remaining assets of the bank (see figure 2) . 11 The cash, bank notes, account books, and other assets remained in the bank, but they were declared as having been taken over for safekeeping by the Bank of China. By mid-October the sequestrators had drawn up a detailed balance sheet of the liabilities and assets of the head office of the DAB in Shanghai and reported to the Foreign Ministry that their work was going well so far. 12 The sequestrators at the other DAB branches also submitted detailed statements of the existing deposits and debts of their respective branches. However, the Allies wanted to make sure that a proper winding up of the DAB was carried out and submitted a note to the Chinese in September 1917 demanding a "complete liquidation" of German businesses.
14 The Chinese authorities did not start to move against other German businesses, but they held a conference that was attended by representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs; the governor of the Bank of China, Wang
Kemin; and several of the foreign sequestrators employed by the Bank of China. 15 The result of this conference was a document entitled "Regulations Governing the Liquidation of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank," issued on October 16, 1917. 16 These regulations were much more detailed than those that had existed before. Most importantly, all matters relating to the liquidation of the DAB were to be carried out by the Central Bureau for the Liquidation of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, which operated under the control of the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs and was to fix a date from which the liquidation would officially begin.
After this date, debtors and non-enemy creditors of the DAB would have one month to claim their deposits or repay their debt, and the local liquidation bureaus set up for each branch of the DAB were given three months from the fixed date to liquidate all claims and obligations.
If debtors did not discharge their obligations within a month, they were to be reported to the Central Liquidation Bureau. Enemy subjects were still not allowed to access any of their savings and were allowed to receive only a living allowance every month. While the Bank of China was not officially involved in the liquidation works anymore, several of its foreign and Chinese employees were still retained to carry out the liquidation work on the ground, including Passeri and the director of the Shanghai branch of the Bank of China, Song
Hanzhang, who remained jointly in charge of the liquidation of the Shanghai head office of the DAB.
At first glance, these new regulations seemed to be a much clearer step toward liquidation of the DAB and also treated the German and Austrian customers of the bank more harshly. This was especially true for German businesses, which after 1914 had almost all deposited their funds with the DAB and had no way of accessing these funds to maintain their businesses. 17 In this sense the Allies could be satisfied with the new regulations. However, there was also one important loophole. Article 3 of the regulations stated that "all claims and obligations of enemy subjects shall not be included in the liquidation." This meant that the liquidators did not intend to pursue the repayment of debts of German and Austrian customers. Moreover, S. E. Lucas, an employee of the Bank of China, later related that it had been pointed out to all the attendants at the conference that "the word 'liquidation' was understood as 'sequestration.'" 18 In a meeting with the British consul-general in Tianjin,
William Pollock Ker, Lucas also explained that the Chinese government intended that "the position of the [Deutsch-Asiatische] Bank in China at the end of the war will be that any surplus funds will be returned to it, together with all properties and books, and that it will resume business as a going concern," which again shows that China had no intention to confiscate all the bank's assets for its own gain.
This naturally went against the wishes of the British, who wanted to see a full liquidation of the bank, including the realization of all its premises, grounds, and property, so that the bank would be unable to resume business after the war. 19 Conventions. He argued that China had no right to sequester any of the property of the bank, as the bank was a "purely private" business and the protection of private property was one of the most important principles of the Hague Conventions. 24 In a meeting with Beelaerts van Blokland, Chinese foreign minister Wang Daxie objected that the DAB had a "special relationship" with the German government and therefore its business needed to be taken over by the Chinese government.
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The key question was, therefore, what the bank's relationship with the German government was exactly. Like most other foreign banks in China, the DAB had always maintained relatively close contact with its home government, and most German government agencies in China held accounts with the DAB. However, the bank had always remained a private business and even Lucas, who was eager to see the bank fully liquidated, admitted to
Ker that "nothing has been found to indicate any connection between the bank and the German Government." 26 Therefore, the Dutch minister was correct that sequestering the assets of the DAB was illegal according to international law. The Chinese replied that they
were following the precedent of how other Allied countries were treating enemy banks and
were not violating the Hague Conventions. 27 The problem with this argument was that both in China." It concluded that there was no way of "destroying, or even countering German trade and influence in China while this state of affairs is permitted by Peking." The NorthChina Herald reported that it had even been suggested by certain people that China "should be excluded from the Peace Conference" if it did not "mend her ways."
The source behind these newspaper articles was Passeri, the foreign liquidator of the Shanghai head office. From September onward he had started spreading rumors in Shanghai that the Bank of China and the Central Liquidation Bureau were pro-German and were hindering the work of the liquidators in Shanghai, specifically mentioning article 3 of the liquidation regulations and claiming that he had been forced to retain the German employees of the DAB at the German bank's Shanghai head office. As it turned out later, Passeri had not previously opposed the liquidation regulations of the Chinese authorities and had insisted that the German employees of the DAB be retained to help with the liquidation work. The reason why he suddenly started to spread these rumors was that the Bank of China had informed him in August 1918 that his employment contract would not be renewed, as he was not carrying out any work for the bank anymore. Having received this notice, Passeri tried to portray the Bank of China and the Chinese government as pro-German to depict his dismissal as the result of a "German intrigue" in Beijing and to pressure the bank to extend his employment. 33 While it was soon understood that Passeri had acted only for personal reasons and had made up some of the rumors, the fact that the liquidation had been carried out in what the Allies regarded "a slack and inefficient manner" had become evident and was now widely known. 34 When Passeri started to spread rumors and information about the state of the liquidation, one of the first people he talked to was George E. Morrison, China correspondent of the London Times. 35 Apart from writing the aforementioned article for the Times,
Morrison, a longtime opponent of German trade in China, communicated the state of the liquidation to the British China Association, which represented British China merchants and was keen to eliminate German trade in China. Morrison had asked the association to "telegraph home in order that the matter might come up in Parliament." 36 The result was that the liquidation of the DAB was indeed brought up in the House of Commons on November 6, 1918, when Walter Faber, a member of the Conservative Party, asked Foreign Secretary
Arthur Balfour "why the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, which is the keystone of the German commercial system in China, has not been put into liquidation; and when it is likely to be so put?" Balfour's reply was that the Allied ministers to China had already "called the attention of the Chinese Government to the inadequacy," which they had indeed done on October 30. With pressure increasing both at home and within the foreign community in China, Jordan, the British minister to China, had to take more drastic measures to ensure that the liquidation was carried out properly. In November he contacted and accused the Chinese government of having favored Germany and delayed the liquidation of the DAB and other German businesses. He urged them to take the liquidation seriously to ensure that German firms could not resume their business now that the war had ended, in order to guarantee that it was Britain alone who would reap the benefits of the China trade after the war. 40 At the same time, Allied diplomats in Beijing felt that it had to be made clear to the Chinese that, unless they cooperated with the liquidation, they would receive little help from the Allies "when their so-called delegates" reached Europe for the peace conference. 41 By now, the Chinese government was also starting to fear that Britain would not support China at the postwar peace conference, attendance at which had been one of the main reasons for China's entry into the war. 42 The Chinese tried to concede by removing the German DAB employees from the liquidation works in Shanghai, allowing enemy debtors to be included in the liquidation process, and sending Lucas to Shanghai as a representative of Britain to replace Passeri and to conduct the liquidation with Song Hanzhang. 44 Jordan had also early on suggested that he would prefer a British banker and someone not under the control of the Bank of China to be involved in the liquidation, and so on December 14 he asked Fraser to inquire whether Stephen would be interested in carrying out the liquidation himself. 45 Stephen agreed with great enthusiasm. 46 Jordan had already persuaded the other Allied ministers to support Stephen, and now the Allies approached the Chinese and suggested that Stephen should take over the liquidation. appointment allowed him to act on his own in urgent matters. Therefore, he should act as he saw fit; if the Chinese complained, he could be assured that the Allied ministers would back him. 52 However, at least in the matter of his Chinese co-liquidator, Stephen got his way. After Song Hanzhang handed in his resignation in December 1918, the Chinese authorities did not appoint a new Chinese co-liquidator for Shanghai. 53 Stephen took over the liquidation of the DAB in Shanghai on January 1, 1919, but he appointed HSBC banker Brent to handle the actual liquidation work. 54 At first, the main objective of Brent and his assistants was to create lists of the outstanding debtors of the DAB, which included in particular German debtors, whose debt repayment had previously not been pursued. The greater part of the cash balance of the DAB Shanghai, which the German bankers had transferred to an account under the name of the Dutch legation to protect it from the liquidation, was also retransferred to an account under the name of the DAB. 55 They then started to pursue outstanding debtors for repayment. Debtors were given up to a month to repay their debts before legal proceedings were started against them at the International Mixed Court in Shanghai. 56 This practice had already been started by Lucas when he was briefly co-liquidator in Shanghai in November and December. By mid-December 1918, two hundred cases of outstanding debtors had been brought before the Mixed Court. 57 Beelaerts van Blokland protested against this practice. Besides the fact that the liquidation of the DAB was illegal, he argued that giving debtors only one month to repay their debt had the sole purpose of "destroying the business of German merchants," as most of them had run out of sufficient funds because of the war and had no way of transferring the necessary money from Germany in such a short time. He also protested that if China wished to file legal proceedings against debtors, they should at least be carried out before Chinese courts, instead of mixed courts, which were dominated by the Allies and biased against the Germans. 58 In fact, after
China's entry into the war in August 1917, China had declared that enemy subjects were to be tried before Chinese courts if they committed crimes (Xu 2005, 169) .
Apart from recovering debts, Stephen's other main goal was selling the buildings of the DAB and the German Club in Shanghai, the latter having held a DAB loan of 280,000
Shanghai taels secured by a mortgage on the club building. 59 For Stephen, these buildings were the main symbols of the German presence in Shanghai, and he believed that their sale would unmistakably show the Chinese that "the Germans are beaten and that their political influence is at an end." 60 In the following months, the liquidation work in Shanghai progressed swiftly, and by
May 1919
Stephen was sure that liquidation work could be concluded within a month. 65 In
June he reported that "considerable progress [had] been made with selling enemy property and real estate" and a total amount of 2.25 million Shanghai taels had already been realized in this way since January. 66 Of this amount, 1.59 million Shanghai taels came from the sale of the German Club, the premises of the bank in Shanghai, and the premises of the Jinan branch of the bank. 67 The rest of the money came from the realization of property of mostly German individuals and businesses in Shanghai and elsewhere that were debtors of the DAB in Shanghai. One example is the property of the Hamburg-Amerika Linie-an important
German shipping company and competitor of British shipping-whose property at Wuhu was sold for 63,300 Shanghai taels to repay an overdraft it had with the DAB. 68 In a number of cases, however, the liquidators were not able to successfully pursue debtors. For example,
Stephen reported that the premises of the German trading house Diederichsen & Co. in Hankou had not been sold, and he blamed this on the merchants' connections to Chinese officials there. 69 Still, Jordan was very pleased with the work Stephen had done, and by June the liquidators in Shanghai were able to reduce their personnel and start to conclude the operations. 70 As Stephen put it, the bank's "organisation at Shanghai [had been] completely broken up." had not been able to compensate for. 73 Although the bank resumed operations in China, its business never reached prewar levels again. Table 1 shows the development of the total assets of the bank between 1900 and 1932 and demonstrates the extent to which the bank's postwar business lagged behind the heights it had reached before the war. The main cause for this was the great losses the bank had suffered due to the bank's liquidation in China. It is more difficult to estimate the impact of the liquidation on German businesses and waned. The British demand that all German businesses in China be liquidated to repay all debts of German firms with the DAB was never followed. 75 Nevertheless, the liquidation did have a profoundly negative impact for German businesses in Shanghai and elsewhere. By June 1919, the liquidators had already managed to sell property worth 660,000 Shanghai taels belonging to German individuals and businesses.
The long list of debtors whose property had been liquidated also shows that the liquidation mostly hit small businesses and must have had a decisive impact on the ability of these small firms to resume their China business after the war. One such case was that of the soap manufacturer Gustav Boehm, who had an overdraft of almost 150,000 Shanghai taels and whose manufactured goods were seized and sold after a judgment by the International Mixed Court on January 9, 1919. 76 William Kirby has rightly pointed out that German businesses managed to reestablish themselves in the early 1920s in China "in an unexpectedly rapid fashion" (Kirby 1984, 17) . However, we should not forget the profoundly negative impact new connections to other foreign or Chinese banks. This must have been especially difficult for Xu Xingquan, the Shanghai compradore of the bank, whose family had worked for the DAB ever since it opened for business in Shanghai in 1890. 78 Another aspect of the liquidation was that after the closure of the bank, native banks that had deposited money with the DAB also could not access it for a period of time. The Tong Feng and Shun Kang banks, for example, which had deposited silver sycee worth 8,000
Shanghai taels with the DAB in Shanghai, were at first not allowed to retrieve these sycee, which were important capital for their business, after the DAB was closed. It was only in October 1917, after the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce intervened with the Chinese Foreign Office on their behalf, that the boxes of sycee were returned to them. 79 A last common problem that Chinese businesses encountered was that German businesses were unable to repay their debts to the Chinese, as they were not allowed to access funds that had been deposited with the DAB. 80 While these examples cannot provide a full picture of the impact of the liquidation on the DAB's former Chinese business partners, they still show that the liquidation of a bank that had been an integral part of the Chinese financial system created a great disturbance among Chinese businesses. Clearly, the liquidation impacted not only German businesses and the bank itself but also those many Chinese businesses to which they were connected.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank got caught up in the geopolitics and The liquidation not only kept the DAB from regaining its former position as a leading bank in China but also contributed to the difficulties that German businesses faced when they tried to reestablish themselves after the war. It also had a detrimental effect on Chinese businesses connected to the DAB and other German businesses.
The liquidation of the DAB reveals the vulnerability of modern China's globalized treaty port economy to political crises and global shifts of power. The economy of the treaty ports depended on a "politically and legally stable environment" that made the international flows of capital and commodities passing through these ports possible (So 2011, 5) . Due to the weakness of the Chinese state, an important element in the structure of the treaty ports was the relative equality of power among the different foreign powers contending for influence there (Taylor 2002, 133) . For foreign businesses and their Chinese business partners, this relative power equilibrium protected them from arbitrary actions by other foreign powers against their businesses and guaranteed free competition and cooperation in business. As a consequence, the treaty port economy of the China coast was tied not only to the fluctuations of international markets but also to the global balance of power of the prewar era that was reflected in the treaty ports.
The beginning of the war in 1914 and the subsequent disintegration of the global economy and decline of the China trade had already hurt foreign businesses in China.
However, it was China's entry into the war in 1917 that completely upset the balance of power in the treaty ports and brought the shift in global power relations to China. This meant the end of the political and legal stability of the treaty ports based on the power equilibrium among the foreign powers. The DAB and other German businesses were left without a home government to rely on for protection and with only international law and a weak Chinese state to defend them. Unwilling to carry out a full liquidation of German businesses, China at first tried to adopt a strategy of compromise between acquiescing to Allied demands and making it possible for the DAB and other German businesses to resume their operations after the war by merely sequestering the assets of the DAB. However, the weak position of the Chinese state in the treaty port economy manifested itself in its inability to maintain this strategy in the long run. Due to its dependence on the good will of the other Allies, China was eventually compelled to allow the full liquidation of the DAB by Britain and the other Allies.
Evidently, not only in Europe and the United States but also in China, international law proved futile in protecting private businesses from the global nature of economic warfare during the First World War. 81 As was the case elsewhere in the world, the end of the prewar order of power and the conflict between the Allies and the Central Powers proved detrimental for global business and economic globalization in China. 82 The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank's liquidation can also provide some insights into China's involvement in the First World War outside the economic sphere. When China declared war against Germany, it justified its entry into the war with its respect for international law and its desire to "establish [itself] amidst the family of nations" as an equal member. 83 However, if we look at whether or not these idealistic goals were realized in China after the declaration of war, the picture becomes much more complicated. While China's entry into the war allowed it to regain some of its sovereignty by recovering the German and Austrian concessions, this did not change the fact of China's political weakness compared to the other Allies. As a result, just as the Chinese were not treated equally at the Paris Peace
Conference, so they were not treated as equals at home. The Allies-especially the Britishwanted to extend their economic warfare to China and expected German businesses to be eliminated as one of China's contributions as an ally. While China's initial compromise of only sequestering the assets of the DAB already meant violating international law, China later was forced to allow the full liquidation of the DAB by the Allies, despite its reluctance to move against German businesses. Eventually, China was not only again denied equality; by moving against the DAB and later permitting its liquidation, it also ended up violating the very international law it had put so much value on when entering the war. 
Ghassan Moazzin is a PhD candidate in East Asian

